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We examine how subjectivity in performance measurement and reward systems (PMRS) is 
used to mitigate incentive contracting risks. Drawing on data from 38 interviews with 
supervisory and subordinate managers in four firms, we provide a more comprehensive 
explanation of the role of subjectivity in risk mitigation than is evident in the prior literature. 
We provide empirical evidence of the importance firms place on the use of subjectivity to 
mitigate the risk of incentive misalignment and employee sorting errors relative to its well-
documented role in mitigating employee compensation risk. We find that incentive 
misalignment arising from unanticipated behavioral responses to performance measures is a 
particularly important risk, managed through subjective performance assessments. The extent 
of subjectivity we observe poses a significant risk of errors and bias. We observe that both 
vertical and horizontal information gathering and review by calibration panels are key 
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Recent global scandals reflect the dark side of incentive-driven behavior in 
organizations1. Incentives can lead to egregious behaviors because the underlying 
performance measures cannot be fully aligned with firm value creation, giving rise to a range 
of incentive contracting risks for firms and employees. Subjectivity in performance 
measurement and rewards systems (PMRS) is commonly viewed as a partial solution to these 
risks (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1994). We draw on field studies in four large global firms 
to investigate the role of subjectivity in managing three incentive contracting risks. First, we 
investigate the role of subjectivity in addressing incentive misalignment, in which firms 
reward valued efforts that would otherwise be unrecognized or, conversely, avoid rewarding 
employees for behaviors or decisions that produce sub-optimal outcomes for the firm 
(Roberts 2010; Bol 2008; Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus 2004). Second, we 
examine the use of subjectivity to mitigate the risk of employee sorting errors that arise 
because performance measures also influence decisions about employee retention, promotion 
and task assignments (Prendergast 2002; Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988; Moers 2005). 
Third, subjectivity is used to mitigate employee compensation risk when performance 
measures are influenced by uncontrollable factors (Datar, Kulp, and Lambert 2001).  
While subjectivity is introduced into PMRS to enhance incentive alignment and 
employee sorting and to reduce compensation risk, it also introduces its own risk of errors 
and bias associated with unverifiable subjective assessments (Moers 2005; Bol 2008; Luft, 
Shields, and Thomas 2016). We investigate the relative salience of incentive misalignment, 
employee sorting errors and compensation risk as rationales for the use of subjectivity (the 
 
1 E.g., Volkswagon in Germany; Wells Fargo in the United States; Barclays Bank in the United Kingdom; 





upside of subjectivity). We also investigate the strategies firms use to mitigate errors and bias 
associated with subjectivity (the downside). 
Our primary motivation for this study is to gain rich field-based insights into the role 
of subjectivity within PMRS. Subjectivity is ubiquitous in PMRS within firms (Bol 2008; 
Woods 2012; Kampkotter and Sliwka 2015), yet we do not fully comprehend its role in 
mitigating incentive contracting risks (Gibbs 2016). In particular, the literature is very clear 
on incentive misalignment as an important contracting problem, and the theory literature 
proposes subjectivity as one solution. However, there is remarkably little empirical evidence 
of the use of subjectivity to enhance incentive alignment and employee sorting, relative to its 
role in managing compensation risk. Our study is designed to exploit the advantages of field 
site access to examine the rationale underpinning subjectivity in multiple PMRS practices 
(measures, ratings and rewards) occurring in combination, as well as the organizational 
practices that limit the downside risk of subjectivity. In doing so we answer Gibbs’ (2016) 
call for case-based insights into the structures, patterns, methods of decision making and 
policies firms adopt that impact compensation. 
We find that the four firms in our study use subjectivity in ways that have not been 
fully captured in empirical studies. We find that the firms rely extensively on ex post 
subjective assessments of subordinate behavior to minimize incentive misalignment and 
employee sorting errors. We observe a subjective overlay on objective measures and 
considerable discretion in weightings on objective measures and subjective assessments. 
Further, we find that subjective assessments tend to be non-lenient in that they either confirm 
or downgrade objective performance results that subordinates deliver in ways that are not 
consistent with broader firm goals. The subjectivity we capture reflects “ex post discretional 
adjustments based on factors other than the performance measures specified ex ante” (Bol 





assessments to both validate or realign single period bonus awards, and to determine task 
assignments, retention and promotion (employee sorting) decisions. In contrast to prior 
empirical research, the use of subjectivity to address employee compensation risk is a minor 
theme in our data.  
The extent of subjectivity observed in these firms creates uncertainty for subordinates. 
Subordinates are unable to predict their bonus based on objective performance measures 
without also anticipating the impact of a subjective overlay on those measures. The firms 
manage this uncertainty, and the associated potential for errors and bias, by informing and 
validating subjective assessments. All four firms gather information on subordinate behavior 
vertically (through the direct supervisor), horizontally (through interdependent roles internal 
to the firm), and in some cases, externally through clients. In addition to information 
gathering, three of the firms adopt a calibration process in which peer and senior managers 
review and challenge subordinate ratings. The fourth firm offers an interesting contrast with 
less use of formal rating processes, no formal calibration process, more discretion at the 
bonus reward stage of the PMRS, and less transparency in its application of subjectivity. 
Despite these differences, the findings from this firm suggest that the rationale for 
subjectivity is consistent with the other firms, and reliance on high-level review of ratings is 
important to reduce errors and bias in subjective assessments.  
Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. First, our findings suggest 
that the use of subjectivity to address the risk of incentive misalignment and employee sorting 
errors may be dominant rationales for subjectivity in PMRS. While the use of subjectivity to 
address employee compensation risk is well understood, incentive misalignment is likely a 
more critical problem, but is less studied (Baker 2002; Feltham and Xie 1994). The use of 
subjectivity in PMRS to mitigate the firm risk of incentive misalignment is particularly 





assessments are largely hidden to explicit scrutiny (Bol 2008; Gibbs et al. 2004; Ittner, 
Larcker, and Meyer 2003), and do not leave a clear trace from subjective assessments through 
to bonus outcomes2. Further, while the literature addresses the role of subjectivity in 
promotion decisions (e.g., Grabner and Moers 2013; Bol and Leiby 2018), it does not address 
the role of subjectivity in enhancing relative performance evaluation and employee sorting 
more generally. Economists argue that unreliable assessments of individual contributions to 
the firm result in employee sorting errors (retention, promotion and task assignments) that are 
more costly to the firm than single-period bonus payments (Baker et al. 1988; Lazear and 
Shaw 2007; Prendergast 2002). By focusing on identifiable subjective measures, or on 
subjectivity that can be traced from discretionary weights on objective performance 
measures, the accounting literature likely underestimates the level of subjectivity that 
underpins performance ratings. These ratings in turn influence both bonus determination and 
employee sorting. Our field study provides new insights into a broad range of subjective 
inputs to performance measurement and the utility firms gain from these subjective 
assessments. 
Second, the literature has recently begun to consider the role of information gathering 
that underpins subjective assessments (Maas, van Rinsum, and Towry 2012; Bol, Kramer, 
and Maas 2016; Gillenkirch and Kreienbaum 2017), as well as the functioning of calibration 
panels as a mechanism to reduce errors and bias in performance measurement (Demeré, 
Sedatole, and Woods 2019; Kampkotter and Sliwka 2015; Arshad, Cardinaels, and Dierynck 
2020; Grabner, Künneke, and Moers 2020; Bol, Braga de Aguiar, Lill, and Coelho 2018). We 
provide new insights into the way managers gather information horizontally, exploiting 
 
2 For example, flexible subjective assessments that draw on a range of objective performance measures and 
other information sources, and which may or may not alter “objective” performance ratings, are common in 
practice but very difficult to observe in archival data. In contrast, discretionary weights explicitly applied ex 





interactions among interdependent roles internal and external to the firm to inform and 
validate subjective assessments both at the initial rating stage and in calibration panels.  
Third, our findings provide insight into the use of subjectivity to reduce uncertainty 
about the veracity of performance measurement where there is potential for incentive 
misalignment or employee sorting errors. In many cases initial subjective assessments by 
supervisors confirm the ratings determined from objective measures. Further, calibration 
panels then typically confirm supervisors’ initial ratings. Even when the information 
gathering underpinning subjective assessments produces few changes in performance ratings, 
it is valuable in reducing uncertainty regarding the performance signal from objective 
measures. This use of subjectivity to reduce uncertainty is hidden in archival data because the 
subjective assessments do not manifest in altered bonuses. In the context of calibration, our 
findings support those of Demeré et al. (2019) and Bol et al. (2018) by noting that ratings and 
bonuses change in a minority of cases during calibration. We extend this literature by 
exploring the value of calibration to firms and employees even when ratings and bonuses do 
not change. 
Overall, the findings from our study suggest that extensive reliance on subjective 
PMRS can improve incentive alignment and employee sorting for managerial roles. 
However, exploiting the upside benefits of subjectivity requires that firms are also able to 
utilize reliable observations about employee performance and discipline evaluating managers 
against errors and bias.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Subjectivity and Contracting Risks 
Incentive Alignment and Compensation Risk 
Gibbs et al. (2004) and Bol (2008) identify three points in the PMRS process at which 





ante but measured ex post using non-verifiable information (for example, measures of 
“leadership”, “collaboration” and “effective training of subordinates”). Second, the firm 
relies on objective performance measures, but subjectively re-weights these measures ex post 
to allow for changed conditions. Third, contracts allow for flexible discretionary adjustments 
based on a combination of performance measures and other information available ex post. 
Such adjustments allow that agent effort, action choices and outcomes are clearer ex post 
than they are ex ante (Baker et al. 1988). These approaches are not mutually exclusive and 
tend to be used in combination (Bol 2008; Gibbs et al. 2004). 
These three forms of subjectivity, and their underlying rationales, have attracted 
different levels of attention in the literature. The theory literature focuses particularly on 
opportunities to either subjectively re-weight performance measures as conditions change, or 
to determine discretionary bonuses ex post to mitigate compensation risk (Baiman and Rajan 
1995; Baker et al. 1994; Baker 2002; Feltham and Xie 1994). The empirical literature largely 
follows the theory literature by focusing on employee compensation risk and the associated 
need for discretionary adjustments, or discretionary performance measure weights (e.g., Liu 
and Leitch 2013; Bol, Hecht, and Smith 2015; Hӧppe and Moers 2011; Anderson, Dekker, 
Sedatole, and Wiersma 2020). Some economists suggest that while compensation risk is a 
common rationale for subjectivity in the literature, it is not a central issue in most incentive 
contracts in practice (Baker 2002; Prendergast 2002; Feltham and Xie 1994). Incentive 
misalignment is typically more challenging and costly to remedy than compensation risk 
(Feltham and Xie 1994).  
Accounting studies that do attempt to operationalize the use of subjectivity to enhance 
incentive alignment are constrained by limited proxies in the context of both the incidence of 
subjectivity and the nature of incentive misalignment. Several studies focus on discretionary 





However, the use of discretionary weights only partially mitigates incentive misalignment as 
it assumes that the pre-contracted set of performance measures themselves are complete. 
Early studies focus on ‘individual measures’ or unexplained compensation outcomes as a 
proxy for discretionary rewards at the CEO level (Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith 1996; 
Hayes and Schaeffer 2000). Recent studies examine the use of subjectivity in specific settings 
such as those requiring creativity (Grabner 2014), pursuit of a quality strategy (Van der 
Stede, Chow, and Lin 2006) or autonomous motivation (Kunz 2015), implying that 
subjectivity enhances incentive alignment in these settings. 
Gibbs et al. (2004) is one of the first studies to access archival field data to assess the 
rationale underpinning subjective bonuses within firms. They find evidence of the use of 
subjectivity to address compensation risk, but they do not find a consistent association 
between subjective bonuses and incentive misalignment attributable to performance measure 
incompleteness, short-term focus or manipulability. They acknowledge that their archival 
proxies for the weaknesses in quantitative metrics are crude (including, for example, number 
of measures as a proxy for completeness). The field site Gibbs et al. (2004) study provides a 
distinctive subjective bonus which is identifiable and incremental to a formula bonus. 
Several recent studies shed light on less constrained forms of subjective assessments, 
which do not reflect discretionary weights, specific subjective measures defined ex ante, or 
explicit discretionary bonus payments. In a footnote to Woods’ (2012) study, he notes that in 
his setting, subjective adjustments to objective measures are designed to “align individual 
work with the organization’s mission and priorities and account for factors that are necessary 
for effective, efficient work accomplishment that the measures alone may not achieve”3. This 
observation points to a broad subjective overlay on objective performance measures. Deller 
 
3 See footnote 4 on page 405. Woods (2012) sets out to examine supervisor behavior given a change in 
performance measurement practice. He identifies the incidence of subjectivity with a 0/1 indicator variable 





and Sandino (2020) also assess the use of subjectivity in a field setting where subjective 
assessments are intended to reward honesty and consistent adherence to company values and 
goals4. These are important observations because they draw attention to a behavioral aspect 
of incentive alignment which has not featured in the subjectivity literature. The opportunity to 
assess performance subjectively ex post, drawing on non-contractible but decision-relevant 
information is valuable to firms, particularly to address the potential for incentive 
misalignment. Woods’ (2012) and Deller and Sandino’s (2020) observations of relatively 
unconstrained subjectivity address the risk of incentive misalignment highlighted by Baker et 
al. (1988, 598): “The principal knows, in general terms, what he wants the agent to do, but 
the range of possible actions that the agent can take and the range of possible outcomes is 
enormous”. However, these flexible discretionary adjustments are difficult to capture 
empirically. Deller and Sandino (2020) claim to be the first to test the use of subjectivity to 
reward employees for “doing things the right way” in a tournament setting, suggesting there 
is little empirical evidence to date on the way firms use subjectivity to mitigate the risk of 
employee behaviors that adversely impact firm value. 
Data limitations are a significant impediment in efforts to capture incentive alignment 
as a rationale for subjectivity. For example, in the context of complex tasks, the 
incompleteness of objective performance measures is a prime rationale for subjectivity, 
theoretically, intuitively and anecdotally, yet it is very difficult to capture empirically. 
Incomplete objective performance measures manifest in a range of ways which are well 
understood in the literature, including self-interest or a lack of co-operation in the firms’ 
interest, gaming, shirking, as well as a range of behaviors inconsistent with firm values 
(Roberts 2010). However, the literature cannot consistently capture the use of subjectivity to 
address incomplete objective performance measures (e.g., see Anderson et al. (2020); Gibbs 
 





et al. (2004)5). Another reason for the lack of empirical evidence on the use of subjectivity to 
address the incompleteness of objective performance measures is that the literature provides 
little insight into the most flexible form of subjectivity documented by Gibbs et al. (2004) and 
Bol (2008), which allows for flexible discretionary adjustments drawing on multiple 
information sources beyond performance measures specified ex ante. Both Woods’ (2012) 
and Deller and Sandino’s (2020) site descriptions suggest that this form of subjectivity could 
be important to firms in using ex post information about employee effort, performance and 
task execution to ensure incentive alignment. Beyond the descriptive evidence in these 
studies, there is little evidence in the literature of this use of subjectivity to address the risk 
that objective measures are deficient in ways that cannot be fully anticipated when 
contracting.  
Employee Sorting 
In addition to distributing rewards, the multi-purpose PMRS that underpin incentive 
contracts are also used to rank and sort employees. Routine performance measurement is an 
important input to employee sorting, for example, in determining employee retention (Woods 
2012; Cichello, Fee, Hadlock, and Sonti 2009) and promotion prospects (Campbell 2008; 
Grabner and Moers 2013; Bol and Leiby 2018; Ederhof 2011).  Unreliable assessments of 
individual contributions to firm value result in distorted assessment of employees’ relative 
value to the firm. Employee sorting errors can be particularly costly because employees are 
likely concerned with the way their assessed performance affects their future in the firm, and 
the firm is concerned with retaining the right people and effective task assignments. These 
concerns may override issues about single period bonus payments (Baker et al. 1988; 
 
5 Anderson et al. (2020) proxy a control variable, task complexity, by store size and Gibbs et al. (2004) proxy 
performance measure completeness by number of objective performance measures. Neither study consistently 





Prendergast 2002; Moers 2005; Rankin and Sayre 2011; Campbell 2008; Gibbs 1995; Bol 
2008). 
Firms invoke subjectivity to facilitate relative performance evaluation and avoid 
costly sorting errors (Deller and Sandino 2020; Campbell 2008; Grabner and Moers 2013). 
The literature on the role of subjectivity in employee sorting focuses particularly on the 
subjective weights applied to non-financial measures (Campbell 2008) or current 
performance (Grabner and Moers 2013) in order to capture the different demands of current 
and higher-level roles. The focus of these studies is on the way objective and subjective 
performance measure inputs to promotion decisions may deviate from those used to 
determine current compensation (Bol and Leiby 2018; Cichello et al. 2009). However, they 
do not investigate the role of subjectivity in current performance measurement as a key input 
to relative performance evaluation and employee sorting more generally. 
Subjectivity as a Source of Additional Firm-Level and Employee-Level Risks  
 
Subjectivity in PMRS enables firms to improve incentive alignment and employee 
sorting, and reduce compensation risk compared with PMRS based solely on objective 
measures. However, subjectivity also has a well-established downside risk. Subjective 
assessments are potentially riddled with errors and bias (Bol 2008; Moers 2005; Luft et al. 
2016). When managers make subjective evaluation decisions they weigh up personal costs 
and benefits, and they may lack incentives to invest in information acquisition to support 
accurate subjective assessments (Bailey, Hecht, and Towry 2011; Maas et al. 2012; Bol 
2011). Biased or error-prone subjective assessments exacerbate rather than mitigate incentive 
misalignment by rewarding the wrong behaviors or outcomes and by reducing the clarity of 
performance expectation signals. Biased or error-prone assessments also introduce costly 





talent (Bol et al. 2016; Kampkotter and Sliwka 2015; Ahn, Hwang, and Kim 2010). Errors 
and bias undermine the potential for subjectivity to improve incentive contracting. 
Optimizing the Upside/Reducing the Downside of Subjectivity 
Firms face tensions in managing the upside of subjectivity, which can improve 
incentive contracting, and the downside in which subjectivity introduces additional risks due 
to bias and errors. Firms can optimize the upside value of subjectivity by adopting strategies 
to mitigate the risk of errors and bias in subjective PMRS. Much of the incentive contracting 
literature is built on the principle of unobservable agent action (Feltham and Xie 1994). 
However, supervision of subordinates is an important feature of large organizations and 
supervisor observations are an important input to subjective performance assessments. 
Observation and information gathering about subordinates (albeit imperfect) facilitates the 
use of informed subjectivity (Fisher, Maines, Peffer, and Sprinkle 2005; Maas et al. 2012; 
Bol 2016).  
Recent empirical studies consider the role of monitoring as a key input to subjective 
assessments. Hӧppe and Moers (2011) find that board monitoring intensity is a determinant 
of the accuracy of unverifiable signals and is therefore critical to the value of subjective 
performance measurement of CEOs. Several experimental studies examine performance 
feedback and information gathering about subordinates as an input to performance 
measurement. For example, Fisher et al. (2005) introduce private supervisor information 
arising from observability of subordinate action. Gillenkirch and Kreienbaum (2017) find that 
supervisors invest in information gathering about subordinates which is more consistent with 
norm enforcement than efficient contracting and Maas et al. (2012) examine information 
gathering in team settings. Bol et al. (2016) consider information accuracy and transparency 
as mechanisms to reduce centrality bias. These studies all capture experimentally an aspect of 





address the range of opportunities that exist within firms for supervisors to observe 
subordinate behavior directly and to exploit interdependencies within the firm to gather 
information which informs ex post subjective assessments.  
Recent literature also examines calibration panels as a bias mitigation strategy within 
firms (Demeré et al. 2019; Grabner et al. 2020; Arshad et al. 2020; Kampkotter and Sliwka 
2015; Bol et al. 2018). These studies document the role of calibration in standardizing 
performance benchmarks across supervisors and disciplining supervisors against leniency, 
but do not yet provide insights into the formal and informal information-gathering that 
underpins calibration.  
Research Questions (RQ) Guiding our Field Study 
In summary, we draw on field study data to shed light on several dimensions of the 
incentive contracting problem. First, we investigate the rationale for subjectivity. Based on 
extant literature, we distinguish three risks: incentive misalignment, employee sorting errors, 
and compensation risk. Our study design enables us to investigate subjectivity through a 
combination of PMRS practices, including the use of subjective measures, ex post subjective 
ratings which draw in information beyond performance measures, subjective assessments by 
calibration panels and subjective rewards which may or may not flow from ratings. 
Importantly, our field sites provide the opportunity to investigate subjective rating practices 
informed by both objective performance measures and other performance-relevant 
information. We are also able to investigate the information environment that underpins 
subjective assessments, the use of subjectivity to reduce uncertainty and the simultaneous 
management of both the upside and downside risks of subjectivity.  
In RQ1, we investigate the rationale for the subjective PMRS practices adopted in our 
field study firms (the upside).  
RQ 1: How is subjectivity used within PMRS to mitigate the incentive contracting risks of: 





b) Employee sorting errors, and  
c) Compensation risk (uncontrollable influences on performance)?  
In RQ2, we investigate the strategies used to mitigate the risk of errors and bias introduced by 
subjectivity (the downside). 
RQ 2: How do firms manage the risks of errors and bias introduced by subjectivity? 
III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Our study is designed with the aim of generalizing to theory6. That is, we collect data 
that speak to our research questions and allow for both literal and theoretical replications7 
across field study firms. The four firms we study are large, global, and diverse, each from a 
different industry: equipment manufacturing (EquipMan), food manufacturing (FoodMan), 
investment management (InvestServ), and professional services (ProServ)8. We selected 
firms that use some level of subjective evaluation in various stages of the determination of 
performance-based rewards. This excluded, for example, sites in which bonuses are based on 
sales or allocated on the basis of job title or position. We also required access to multiple 
supervisors and their subordinates. Further, we required that all interviewees had managerial 
roles. Initial discussions with a range of firms indicated that the four firms included in our 
study met these criteria, while also exhibiting sufficient differences in their PMRS to 
challenge us to consider the impact of different contexts (Lillis and Mundy 2005).  
We conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with two related levels of 
managers within each organization, predominantly through a “snowball” design. Our initial 
 
6 As expected in a qualitative field study, we make no attempt to generalize our findings to other firms. Rather, 
we draw on rich field insights that enrich and refine the theory base of the subjectivity literature. 
7 Literal replications refer to the potential to corroborate evidence by observing similar manifestations of the 
focal research phenomenon (e.g., subjectivity in PMRS) in different settings with relatively similar conditions. 
Theoretical replications refer to the potential to observe different manifestations of the phenomena in different 
settings characterized by different theoretical conditions (Yin 2014). 
8 All four companies have global operations and interviews were conducted in different countries. EquipMan 
interviews were conducted in the United States, InvestServ and ProServ interviews in the United Kingdom, and 
FoodMan in Australia. Given the global presence of these companies, the nature of the research questions, and 






entry point into each firm provided us with interview access to at least one senior manager at 
a business unit level, who then referred us to peer-level managers, as well as to their direct 
reports who were themselves supervisors for the next level below9. Upon completion of the 
scheduled interviews, we had evidence that our respondents within each firm consistently 
described the PMRS, and that no new themes were emerging. Further, early comparisons 
across the four firms suggested differences in the use of subjectivity across PMRS practices. 
Subsequent analysis revealed both common and idiosyncratic themes, at which stage we 
believed we had sufficient data to speak to our research questions. For simplicity, we refer to 
the two participating levels of management as supervisor and subordinate, while recognizing 
that both levels occupy management roles in their respective organizations. A copy of the 
interview guide is shown in Appendix A. 
The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Our data are drawn 
from interviews with 38 managers at two hierarchical levels (12 supervisory and 26 
subordinate managers). We conducted interviews in three of the firms predominantly on 
site10 while interviews in EquipMan took place by phone due to distance and/or manager 
availability. In some cases, we also had access to company documentation.11 We have 
removed all names and other identifiers in order to preserve the anonymity and 
confidentiality of the firms and their employees. Table 1 reports demographic data for all 
participants.  
Overview of Field Sites  
 
9 We acknowledge the potential for selection bias in the identification of respondents. This is inevitable in a 
field study of this type, where access in itself is a privilege. We acknowledge the potential effect of this bias in 
the limitations section. 
10 Three of the 12 interviews at FoodMan were conducted by telephone due to geographical distance. All other 
interviews at FoodMan, ProServ and InvestServ were conducted on site. 
11 Documentation included performance report pro-formas, evidence of bonus formula components, and 
individual performance measures and how they were captured. These documents, which were confidential and 
only provided for brief on-site viewing, were useful for validating and clarifying our understanding of each 





The four firms in our study differ in the extent to which they adopt a formulaic 
approach to the determination of performance-based rewards12. At one extreme, InvestServ 
has separate bonus pools for each team, no prescribed formula for the allocation of bonuses, 
and a very opaque process. At the other extreme, FoodMan and EquipMan adopt a bonus 
formula which maps directly to a bonus allocation. ProServ is somewhat similar to FoodMan 
and EquipMan, but with added discretion in adjusting the bonus allocation. Importantly for 
the purposes of our study, these bonus schemes mask multiple layers of subjectivity in all 
four firms. In all cases, participants describe PMRS that encourage supervisors to override 
objective measures with subjective judgments regarding the way subordinates achieve 
objective performance results. Three of the firms have formal calibration processes, where 
the subjective judgments of other stakeholders can lead to the adjustment of initial 
performance ratings or bonus allocations submitted by supervisors for individual 
subordinates13. Bonus potential varies by firm, level of management, and over time as 
profitability influences the size of the bonus pool. Among the subordinate-level managers we 
study, bonus potential ranges from around six percent to 20 percent in EquipMan, ProServ 
and FoodMan; and is significantly higher in InvestServ in accordance with financial industry 
norms. Overall, the pay at risk in these firms is consistent with the level of pay at risk in other 
studies of discretionary bonuses using firm-level data (Moers 2005; Bol 2011; Gibbs et al. 
2004).  
Coding Scheme  
In order to structure our analysis of a large volume of interview data, we commence 
with a coding scheme that classifies segments of narrative data to one or more key constructs 
 
12 The online Appendix provides a more detailed description of the PMRS in each of the four firms. 






for analysis. Table 2 contains our coding scheme, including both code definitions and an 
example of each code from our field narratives. 
We begin by identifying the PMRS practices in which subjectivity may be invoked as 
subjective measures, ratings and rewards14. Subjective measures are explicit performance 
indicators that are assessed based on non-verifiable information. Examples include 
“leadership” and “teamwork”. Due to the complexity of the subjective rating processes in our 
data, we find it useful for analysis to separate two rating stages. In the first stage, supervisors 
rate subordinates based on information drawn from formal performance measures and other 
information they access. This information is typically condensed into a numeric scale. The 
second rating stage is a calibration process which introduces a further layer of subjective 
influence on ratings, based on peer supervisor and/or higher-level management review of 
ratings. Following two rating stages, we identify a rewards stage. While performance ratings 
flow through to rewards, we allow for discretion in the determination of bonuses or other 
rewards post-ratings. 
Next, we distinguish three risks addressed by subjectivity: incentive misalignment, 
employee sorting errors and compensation risk. Respondents do not, of course, use the 
terminology of information economics. They do, however, explain the rationale for 
subjectivity in their narratives, and we code these explanations against each incentive 
contracting risk (RQ1)15. We also code narratives that reflect strategies adopted to mitigate 
errors and bias in the subjectivity within each PMRS process (RQ2). These strategies include 
information gathering to validate subjective assessments of individual subordinates (in both 
 
14 We acknowledge that target setting may also involve subjectivity. However, the subjective performance 
measurement and reward literature tends to focus on performance measures, ratings and bonus awards so we 
restrict our domain of observables to these key PMRS processes. 
15 Not all participants provided a rationale. Among those that did articulate a rationale, we were alert to the 
possibility of rationales for subjectivity outside incentive misalignment, employee sorting errors and 
compensation risk. We did not identify any rationales outside these three, other than a few isolated examples. 
Examples provided only once in our data include making subjective assessments based on ‘what has been 
assessed in the past’ (EquipMan supervisor) and in an administrative function ‘doing what needs to happen and 





initial and final rating stages) as well as the function of calibration panels in collating 
information across subordinates. We use a qualitative data software package (NVivo) to code 
the data. Each author initially coded the interviews from their respective field sites but all 
coding was verified through multiple iterations by all three authors.  
Analysis of Qualitative Data  
Qualitative studies generally convey their evidence through the use of quotations 
along with researcher interpretations of broader patterns in data. It is difficult to convey the 
weight of evidence using this approach, and quotations can only constitute examples from 
extensive narratives that form the field study data base. We adopt a systematic method to 
identify narratives in which discussion of specific subjective practices (measures, initial 
ratings, final ratings, rewards) co-occurs with discussion of specific risk rationales and/or 
strategies to mitigate the risk of errors and bias. This technique, established in other fields 
(e.g., Guest and McLellan 2003), and introduced to the accounting literature by Malina and 
Selto (2015), allows us to identify patterns in the data based on the relative frequencies with 
which relevant codes co-occur in narrative segments. We rely on this analysis to guide us in 
relation to the salience of co-occurring themes. We thus avoid the influence of interesting 
outliers or unique observations16 when analyzing prevalent patterns in the data.  
We first obtain the raw frequency of each code by firm (shown in Table 3). These raw 
code frequencies are meaningless in themselves, but they form the basis of the quantification 
of co-occurring themes that follows. We interrogate the data with tools within the software to 
create a matrix indicating the frequencies with which coded narratives referring to each 
subjective practice co-occur with coded narratives relating to each rationale, and the 
incidence of strategies to mitigate errors and bias. Code co-occurrence is defined as “isolated 
 
16 We acknowledge that these unique and outlier observations may be interesting as case study examples of 
unusual situations or catalysts to research, but they are not necessarily a reliable basis for identifying recurring 





pairs of codes applied to text segments and associated with a unique respondent” (Guest and 
McLellan 2003, 191). Co-occurrences proxy for interactions of concepts underlying the 
codes. Code co-occurrence reports show how “thematic domains, concepts or ideas are 
distributed within a data set, beyond simple frequencies” (Namey, Guest, Thairu, and 
Johnson 2008, 145). Table 4 presents the resulting co-occurrences in the data.  
Table 4 identifies prevalent patterns in relations among the key constructs by 
indicating the simple counts of co-occurrences between codes across all four firms. Because 
more commonly used codes are likely to co-occur more frequently, we normalize the co-
occurrences by constructing co-occurrence ratios, or C-ratios, (Malina and Selto 2015).17 We 
use C-ratios to distinguish the relative salience of co-occurring themes. Table 5 presents the 
C-ratios in aggregate across the four firms. There is no standard for a level of C-ratio that is 
“significant” so the numbers in Table 5 are meaningful only in relative terms. It is important 
to note that, while an interviewer may influence the range of themes discussed by 
participants, the salience of co-occurring themes is driven by participants.18 In Appendix B 
we provide the C-ratios by firm. 
IV. FINDINGS  
 
We address our two research questions by analyzing the narratives within each cell. 
Table 5, rows A through C report co-occurrence ratios which relate to RQ1, while rows D 
and E relate to RQ2. We address each row in sequence. Under RQ1, we investigate the 
subjective practices deployed by managers at each stage of the PMRS (measures, initial 
 
17 Co-occurrence exists when a qualitative datum, in whole or in part, is simultaneously covered by more than 
one code. Specifically, Code 1 (of frequency n1) co-occurs with Code 2 (of frequency n2) when Code 1 text 
overlaps or is overlapped by, contains or is contained by, or is identical to Code 2 text (with a frequency of n1,2). 
Co-occurrence is measured by the co-occurrence ratio between two codes, or C-ratio, defined as C1,2 = n1,2 / (n1 
+ n2 – n1,2). The C-ratio falls between 0 (no co-occurrence) and 1 (complete co-occurrence).  
18 More specifically, the risk rationale underpinning subjective practices was in all cases coded based on 
participant responses to open-ended “why” questions as shown in our interview protocol. Researchers did not 
refer to the economic rationales. Furthermore, the range of subjective practices, while available as prompts, 
were also more generally provided by respondents in response to open-ended questions as to “where discretion 
enters the process”. Finally, we attach no meaning to the absolute number of thematic references or the 





ratings, final ratings and rewards) and examine whether the rationale captured in the 
narratives about these practices reflects incentive alignment (Row A), employee sorting (Row 
B), or compensation risk (Row C). We organize our findings by these three risk rationales 
numbering the cells in each row A1 to A4, B1 to B4 etc. for easy reference.  
Findings RQ1: How is Subjectivity Used within PMRS to Mitigate the Incentive 
Contracting Risks of Incentive Misalignment, Employee Sorting Errors and 
Compensation Risk? 
 
Row A: Subjective PMRS Practices to Mitigate the Risk of Incentive Misalignment 
Our analysis of the theme of incentive misalignment co-occurring with subjectivity in 
each PMRS practice results in C-ratios in Table 5, row A. We classify narratives within our 
data as relating to incentive misalignment when subjectivity is applied to assess an 
individual’s contribution to the firm, including their contribution within their designated role 
and their compliance with firm-level behavioral expectations (an example is provided in 
Table 2). Table 5 indicates that the co-occurrence of subjective initial rating and incentive 
misalignment is a particularly salient theme in our data (cell A2). Further, the C-ratio for 
subjective initial rating and incentive misalignment is highly salient in all four firms (see 
Appendix B). Subjective measures, final ratings and rewards each indicate some co-
occurrence with the theme of incentive misalignment.  
Subjective measures/incentive misalignment - Cell A1. Discussion of subjective 
measures is not a strong theme in any of the firms in our study. Subjective measures are used, 
but participants do not necessarily consider them “subjective” because the firms require that 
the measures are as SMART19 as possible. Thus, respondents refer to subjective measures 
infrequently in response to questions about where subjectivity or discretion enters the PMRS 
 
19 SMART is an acronym for Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Responsive and Time-bound. These measurable 
attributes help to clarify the criteria on which performance is assessed, but as the “correctness” of these 
measures cannot be determined by a third party, they are non-verifiable (Bol 2008). Examples from our data 
include the use of 20 bullet points describing traits and behaviors that underpin ‘demonstrate integrity’ (ProServ 





process. We classify such measures as subjective because they rely ex post on unverifiable 
criteria. Examples from our sites include ‘leadership’ and ‘championing core values’ which 
figure prominently in all EquipMan narratives. Subjective measures emerge in our data as 
salient only in the context of correcting incentive misalignment. This is not unexpected. 
Subjective measures reduce (but do not eliminate) incentive misalignment by enhancing the 
completeness of subordinate performance measurement across difficult-to-measure task 
aspects: 
 [You need to] concentrate all your time on business development and bringing in new 
revenues but also delivering the work that you’ve got and doing the wider team stuff; 
because if everybody said ‘no’ to that, nothing would happen. (ProServ subordinate) 
 
Subjectivity in initial ratings/incentive misalignment - Cell A2. One of the 
strongest recurring themes throughout our interviews is distrust in the capacity of ex ante, 
relatively objective performance measures (and SMART subjective measures) to align 
incentives, particularly in relation to corporate values, collaborative team-based 
contributions, and long-term business growth. Subjectivity is invoked across all four firms to 
transform performance measures into a single numerical rating for each employee. 
Supervisors assess subjectively the behaviors subordinates adopt to generate measured 
performance outcomes on each performance measure and weight these behavioral 
assessments highly in ratings. Both supervisor and subordinate participants report that 
explicit performance measures capture ‘what’ subordinates achieve, but do not capture the 
behaviors subordinates employ to achieve their objectives. Supervisors refer to these 
behaviors as the ‘how’ – the extent to which results are achieved in ways which are 
‘consistent with firm values’ and are ‘sustainable’ (FoodMan supervisor), and consistent with 
the firm’s desired ‘core competencies’ (ProServ subordinate). An EquipMan subordinate 
summarizes the importance of initial ratings in mitigating the risk of incentive misalignment 





Going for pure performance metrics, you lose the view of ‘how’ people are behaving 
to deliver the work plan. Somebody may do it at the expense of everybody else in the 
company, especially technical stuff that encourages collaboration, information 
sharing and development of others; the elements cannot just be measured that easily. 
(EquipMan subordinate) 
 
Several participants explicitly link undesirable subordinate behaviors to poor firm outcomes: 
I know you achieved your number but the way you achieved it was disruptive, it 
created the wrong shape to our profit and loss line. (FoodMan subordinate) 
 
Other examples that demonstrate the use of subjectivity in initial ratings to mitigate the risk 
of incentive misalignment include assessing whether the manager ‘created new markets and 
drove sensible business development that won’t immediately yield value’ (ProServ 
supervisor), ‘having some skin in the game so that you work collaboratively for a team 
outcome’ and ‘acting like owners’ (FoodMan subordinates), ‘having impact’ (EquipMan 
supervisor), and contributing to ‘making money’ (InvestServ supervisor).  
In formulating ratings, supervisors exercise discretion in the relative weights placed 
on objective outcomes and subjectively rated behaviors.  
You can deliver the most spectacular outcomes but if you don’t meet the ‘hows’ you 
won’t get an exceptional outcome. And in fact, if you get partially meets or 
unsatisfactory in the ‘how’ you may get an unsatisfactory overall. So there is slightly 
more concern with the ‘how’ than the ‘what’. (FoodMan supervisor) 
 
Somebody who maybe ticked all the boxes in terms of their projects but had awful 
relationships within the workplace, that’s a tricky one. (InvestServ supervisor)  
 
There is some evidence that the influence of outcomes versus behaviors on ratings 
may shift in some roles, during certain economic conditions, or based on hierarchical level. 
For example, a ProServ supervisor perceives a higher implicit weighting on meeting revenue 
targets at Partner (supervisor) level, potentially with behavioral consequences. 
We’re very focused on revenue and there are examples of things that I would consider 
very poor personal behaviors that I would rate very low, where people have been 







Importantly, where a subjective rating on behavior overlays objective performance 
measures, the subjective rating on behavior is likely to confirm or reduce the subordinate’s 
rating, and rarely increase it. This is particularly evident in FoodMan and EquipMan. 
Objective measures produce a formulaic rating, and then supervisors question the behaviors 
that underpin the rating and either affirm the rating, if behaviors are aligned, or adjust it 
downwards where they perceive self-serving behavior:  
A lot of people get marked down because for one reason or another [their actions] 
might not align to the values and culture of the organization. (FoodMan subordinate) 
 
The narratives coded to this cell are particularly salient to RQ1, as they speak directly 
to a focus on subjective ratings as a means of reducing firm risk of incentive misalignment 
arising from a range of sources. These include the management of interdependencies 
(assessing collaboration and teamwork), exploiting growth opportunities (driving business 
development) as well as unanticipated behaviors that are inconsistent with firm values. The 
narratives are overwhelmingly consistent in tone around this rationale and it is the most 
salient theme in response to open questions about the role of subjectivity in the PMRS in all 
four firms20. It is also important to note that the rationale relating to interdependencies in 
these narratives is not about determining the contribution of individual employees, which 
would be a controllability or compensation risk issue. Rather the focus is on ensuring that 
managers collaborate with peers to produce firm-level outcomes; this is an incentive 
alignment issue21.  
Subjectivity in final ratings/incentive misalignment – Cell A3. A further layer of 
subjectivity is applied at the final rating or calibration stage, which occurs in EquipMan, 
FoodMan and ProServ. The purpose of this stage is to arrive at a final rating for each 
 
20 As evident in Appendix B and explained under cell B4, InvestServ deploys subjectivity at the rewards stage 
rather than at the rating stage (so it is not coded to Cell A2). The economic rationale is, however, remarkably 
similar.  
21 The two perspectives on interdependencies as a contracting issue are noted in Gibbs et al. (2004), but the 





subordinate through a review of initial ratings. In all three firms, calibration panels include 
the immediate supervisor of the subordinates under review as well as several peer-level 
and/or higher-level supervisors. The primary role of calibration is to mitigate the risk of 
errors and bias in subjective assessments, which we address under RQ2. However, our coding 
indicates that the calibration stage also has a significant role in enhancing incentive alignment 
by providing an opportunity to assess contributions to the firm that might not be evident 
within the supervisor/subordinate dyad.  
I think there are reasons why some people won’t have met their targets but they’ll still 
have made a huge contribution to the business and I think you need to discuss that in 
a group. (ProServ subordinate). 
 
Participants refer to calibration as an opportunity to draw out the ‘organizational impact’ of a 
subordinate (FoodMan supervisor) or to discuss how an individual’s performance ‘rolls up’ 
to the firm level (FoodMan subordinate). A ProServ supervisor suggests that calibration 
panels assess whether a subordinate ‘has done a good job for their client…but should be 
making a wider contribution to the business’ than the immediate supervisor has taken into 
account in the initial rating.  
Calibration panels are also able to assess how individuals have managed intra-firm 
interdependencies which are important to firm-level outcomes. 
Our Board of Directors…have a kind of open discussion and dialogue to say, ‘look, 
am I right in my read of this staff member, are they a good team player, or are they 
only a good team player for me?’ (FoodMan subordinate). 
 
Mostly, your manager evaluates your performance, but, then at my level, they get buy-
in from the other business leaders who work with you, so they have discussions about 
your performance and how you supported them. (EquipMan subordinate) 
 
Subjective rewards/incentive misalignment – Cell A4. In three of the firms we 
study, subjective ratings determine bonus awards. Thus, we see little subjectivity introduced 
at the rewards stage. In these firms, subjective rewards are less salient than ratings or 





misalignment is a highly salient rationale in the determination of bonus awards in InvestServ. 
At the end of the following sub-section related to Employee Sorting, we explain the approach 
taken at InvestServ. In this firm subjectivity is “bundled” in the determination of subjective 
rewards rather than formal ratings. The economic rationale for subjectivity at InvestServ is 
remarkably similar to the other firms, but the subjectivity is located in a different PMRS 
practice. 
 Row B: Subjective PMRS Practices to Mitigate the Risk of Employee Sorting Errors 
Table 5, row B shows C-ratios resulting from our analysis of co-occurring PMRS 
practices and the theme of employee sorting. We classify narratives as relating to employee 
sorting when subjectivity is used to rank order individuals to differentiate them for the 
purpose of bonus, retention, promotion, or development (an example is provided in Table 2). 
Examination of Table 5, row B suggests that the employee sorting rationale underpins 
subjectivity in both final ratings (cell B3) and subjective rewards (cell B4).  
 Subjective final ratings/employee sorting – Cell B3. Cell B3 captures the use of 
subjective assessments by calibration panels to rank and sort employees. Subjectivity in the 
final rating stage mitigates the risk of employee sorting errors in two related ways. First, in the 
three firms with calibration processes, relative performance evaluation is used to compare 
employees at similar levels to peers elsewhere in the firm.  
We make sure that you just don’t evaluate one person on their behavior by themselves 
but if you benchmark against a peer group then you can tell whether that person 
should be a little bit above water or underwater and that way it becomes a little bit 
more objective relative to a peer group (FoodMan subordinate) 
 
If we look at this group, you can start to see the top performers who have been rated a 
2, kind of as it were, float to the top. You can see that there’s another group here, 2 
lows, and then you start…[asking]… what’s the difference between them and a 3. And 
so some will come down into the 3 high. There isn’t a set of clear metrics where you 
can absolutely say, from the start, this person is a 3 or a 2. (ProServ supervisor) 
 





There’s more a tendency potentially to down-rate than overrate because the 
consequence of that in terms of you overrate somebody and they’re promoted or 
whatever the case and then that individual doesn’t perform. People are very 
concerned about that in our organization, so I think they err on the side of caution 
actually most of the time in terms of not overrating individuals. (FoodMan 
subordinate) 
 
If we were a little harsher on who’s truly a ‘1’ you could…reward those at the top of 
that curve higher. And those are the people you clearly want to retain more than 
anyone else. (EquipMan subordinate) 
 
As well as sorting individual employees through peer benchmarking, the firms also 
apply advisory distributions to the broad cohort subject to calibration. These advisory 
distributions further refine the sorting of employees by providing an expected bell curve for 
the final ratings. Participants in ProServ speak of having to hit a ‘target distribution’.  
Ten per cent have got to get a four. So if you don’t think you’ve done too badly, but 
frankly the rest of your peer group’s done brilliantly, you could be subject to a four 
which is a pretty tough blow. (ProServ subordinate) 
 
Final ratings drive both bonuses and performance feedback in EquipMan, FoodMan 
and ProServ, so subjectivity has a critical role in this process to sort employees based on their 
value to the business.  
Subjective rewards/employee sorting - Cell B4. In EquipMan, FoodMan and 
ProServ, rewards largely follow ratings in a formulaic way. However, we also observe 
several different subjective interventions designed ensure that the “right” people are rewarded 
within the constraints evident in these firms. It is notable that discretion we observe in 
directly determining rewards relates to employee sorting, with little emphasis on incentive 
alignment or compensation risk. Subjective bonuses are not common at FoodMan and 
EquipMan but other subjective financial and non-financial rewards are salient in both firms. 
We observe some adjustments at the salary level, but managers “wrestle” within firm-level 
constraints in exercising discretion in relation to bonuses. 
I’ve got someone on my team who is paid significantly in excess of the midpoint, but 
that’s a conscious decision which reflects a number of things: the person’s 






You’ve got some very strong people with specific technical knowledge or experience 
that would be a huge loss to the company if we lost them…they’re not going to move 
faster than everybody, they’re so senior now. They’re not going to be the CEO. But 
how do you retain them? Maybe they’re really good and you want high performance 
to continue, so that’s the thing we wrestle with. (EquipMan supervisor) 
 
In the absence of significant discretion over performance–based bonuses, EquipMan and 
FoodMan both adopt alternative rewards to ensure the right people are rewarded and retained. 
These include meaningful ‘values in action’ award payments (FoodMan) as well as non-
financial rewards such as mentoring, training or travel (FoodMan). Sometimes rewards are 
promised in the future: 
It’s a retention mechanism. You’re doing great now, we love you and want to keep 
you, and in two or three years we’ll give you money and options for stock. (EquipMan 
subordinate) 
 
ProServ allows for greater discretion in bonus determination than either FoodMan or 
EquipMan, with discretionary bonuses decided at a higher level of management: 
Those couple of individuals at that border, who were quite hard done-by by the forced 
distribution, those people were given a bit more bonus than a ‘3’ would automatically 
result in. (ProServ subordinate) 
 
If the formula says they ought to get 3%, they probably won’t because the view will be 
taken that they’re already paid too much for what they do, so they won’t get that 
(ProServ subordinate) 
 
 There is a second salient theme in this cell, which relates specifically to InvestServ. 
We address this contrasting finding in the next subsection.  
InvestServ. InvestServ does not have a formal rating and calibration process, but 
rather applies much more discretion in the determination of bonuses. Consequently, we 
observe a “bundling” of discretion in subjective rewards at InvestServ which follows a very 
similar rationale to that documented in relation to ratings in the other firms22. Participants 
discuss similar themes of incentive alignment, by rewarding individuals for their attitude, 
 





flexibility and going the extra mile for the company. Echoing earlier themes related to 
employee sorting, they refer to bonuses for excellence suggesting ‘it’s a tool for staff 
retention’ (InvestServ supervisor). Several participants capture the application of direct bonus 
discretion to keep employees, ‘I've been head-hunted’ and they'll say, ‘well, we'll up your 
proportion [of the bonus pool]’ (InvestServ subordinate). Others refer to the alignment of 
rewards with an employee’s long-term potential net contribution to the firm: 
The other thing I take into account is if that person isn’t happy, and they’re going to 
move because of money; how much is it going to cost to replace them? You’ve got the 
time and effort and training involved, and all of that has kind of got a price attached 
to it …I also think about the potential of the individual, so they are taking all their 
exams, they’re clearly bright, then I’ll think, okay, I really need to keep them. I may 
have to overpay them for a couple of years. (InvestServ supervisor) 
 
In several cases within one team, the transparency or accountability around the 
exercise of direct discretion over rewards was questioned. One participant referred to a 
higher-level manager rewarding a subordinate as ‘a very valuable guy to the firm and he 
wants to keep him sweet. I thought hmmmm Ok that’s quite interesting to know’ (InvestServ 
subordinate). While InvestServ has a form of executive oversight over bonus payments, it 
lacks the formality and transparency observed in the other firms. There is no explicit 
calibration, but managers argue the case with senior managers for their subordinates to ‘get 
this guy what I think he deserves’ (InvestServ subordinate). The lack of transparency and 
formalization at InvestServ suggests greater risk of errors and bias and less predictable 
compensation outcomes for employees than we observe in the other firms. We return to this 
theme in the discussion section. 
While the compensation literature focuses largely on subjective bonuses, our findings 
in this cell report that three of the firms apply little discretion at the rewards stage. The 
limited discretion that is available is focused on a sanity check on bonus outcomes emerging 
from the rating and calibration process. InvestServ on the other hand applies considerable 





performance ratings and calibration. Importantly, in the context of RQ1, the rationale behind 
subjectivity is similarly focused on both incentive alignment and employee sorting, whether 
dispersed through PMRS practices or bundled in the determination of bonuses. 
Row C: Subjective PMRS Practices to Mitigate Compensation Risk  
Table 5, row C shows C-ratios resulting from our analysis of co-occurring PMRS 
practices and the theme of using subjectivity to address compensation risk due to the impact 
of uncontrollable factors on subordinate performance. As is evident in row C, the use of 
subjectivity to address compensation risk is not a strong theme in our data. It is a moderately 
salient theme in arriving at initial ratings (cell C2) in EquipMan and FoodMan, and in 
subjective rewards (cell C4) in InvestServ (see Appendix B). The narratives relating to 
compensation risk (cell C2) are consistent with the extant literature on this theme: 
Folks having an understanding, discretion, realization that things do change and 
there are surprises, exceptions, challenges, changes in the business…. (EquipMan 
subordinate) 
 
Markets like ours...can go to the region and to [Head Office] ultimately and say ‘I’ve 
had an extraneous circumstance that was beyond our control and I’m applying for 
relief for our business unit against the budget’. (FoodMan supervisor) 
 
Others refer to making judgements as to whether to ‘re-contract’ or not (EquipMan 
subordinate) and the development of ‘informal agreements’ around targets as project 
portfolios change during the year (FoodMan subordinate). 
Importantly, this is a considerably less salient theme than incentive misalignment, and 
less salient than employee sorting in all four firms. Furthermore, it is notably absent as a 
theme in ProServ. We suggest contingent determinants of the relative importance of 
compensation risk as an avenue for further research. 
Findings RQ2: How do Firms Manage the Risks of Errors and Bias Introduced by 
Subjectivity? 
 
To be rendered informative, subjective assessments must be relatively free of bias and 





bias when making subjective assessments. This question of how firms manage the downside 
risk of subjectivity is particularly relevant given the extent of subjectivity in PMRS practices 
that we report in our analysis under RQ1. To examine risk mitigation strategies salient to 
RQ2, we draw on the narratives underpinning the cells in Table 5, rows D and E. We focus 
particularly on cells D2, D3 and E3, which have high C-ratios.  
Risk Mitigation in Initial Ratings/Individual Subordinates – Cell D2.  
An important element in subjective adjustments to ratings based on adverse behaviors 
is the reliable observation of a subordinate’s behavior. Participants refer to the importance of 
direct observation feeding into the behavioral dimension of performance ratings. References 
to supervisor observations include ‘what she sees and what she hears, how I’m demonstrating 
[those behaviors]’ (EquipMan subordinate), ’it’s very much around observation and 
feedback from key members’ (FoodMan subordinate) and ‘because of how we’re structured… 
[knowing] exactly what each person is… doing each day’ (InvestServ subordinate). In 
addition, all four firms adopt formal processes of seeking feedback from internal 
stakeholders, colleagues on interdependent tasks, junior and senior staff, which is 
incorporated in initial ratings. Sources include 360-degree feedback (FoodMan), internal 
surveys (ProServ), and gathering information from clients (ProServ). Examples include: 
I’ll seek a lot of input from stakeholders… I think I talked to 8 or 10 people for every 
one of my direct reports on how well they were doing. (EquipMan subordinate) 
 
The reality is that… if the guy’s lazy his laziness will show through. You won’t be able 
to pull the wool over management’s eyes or let them have the perception that he’s a 
really hard worker, a star performer, but in reality he’s not. We’re all going to find 
out about it.’ (InvestServ subordinate)  
 
Don’t promise [a rating]… you say to them, this is what I’m observing, I’m going to 
check in with the other managers. (FoodMan supervisor) 
 
Contrary evidence. The data coded to this cell also capture flaws in the feedback 





You are required to request feedback from stakeholders as well as direct reports. To 
be honest, the challenge with that is, rarely is it that useful, because people normally 
give good feedback, right? (EquipMan supervisor) 
 
The biggest thing is people not prioritizing getting feedback from people they know 
they’re not going to get good feedback from…. But I think that the moderation group 
are quite savvy to that. (ProServ subordinate) 
 
Risk Mitigation in Final Ratings – Cells D3 and E3.  
 These highly salient cells capture the role of calibration in mitigating the risks of 
errors and bias in subjective assessments. While calibration introduces a further layer of 
subjectivity, it is evident in the narratives outlined below that supervisors, and more 
importantly subordinate managers, believe calibration resolves rather than exacerbates the 
risk of errors and bias.  
 Final Rating/Individual Subordinates- Cell D3. The calibration process allows for 
additional opportunities for informed subjectivity by surfacing a broader set of observations 
and feedback about individual subordinates than in the initial ratings process. Narratives 
highlight information sharing from peer and cross-functional supervisors:  
So their results were outstanding and as soon as you got into calibration you had all 
the other functions saying yeah but nobody wants to work with that person, he’s just 
burnt every bridge…. The person just tumbled back down on that basis. (FoodMan 
subordinate) 
 
If people in the room feel, why is S a 2, I thought she would be a 3, I’ve had issues 
with her this year, I don’t think she’s meeting expectations. (EquipMan subordinate) 
 
Importantly, while information tabled at calibration comes from outside the 
supervisor/subordinate dyad, participant managers talk about interdependencies within the 
firms that lead to well-informed observations and contributions to the discussions about 
individual subordinates: 
We should know those 150 people [discussed at a calibration meeting]… but 10-20% 
we’ll know really well ‘cause we’re cross-functioning with them’ (FoodMan 
supervisor). 
 
There’s always at least four or five people that know enough about the individual in 






These findings point to the use of calibration panels to draw on cross-functional 
interdependencies to inform subjectivity in a way that is not highlighted in other studies.  
Final Rating/Across Subordinates - Cell E3. We find that calibration mitigates the 
risk of errors from the use of different performance benchmarks by facilitating comparison 
among supervisors. Participants highlight the role of calibration in ensuring that ‘everybody’s 
exercising the same level of fairness and judgement’ (ProServ supervisor), or of helping 
supervisors to see their own ratings as ‘harsh’ compared to their peers (EquipMan 
subordinate; FoodMan subordinate). An EquipMan subordinate uses the term ‘juried’ to 
describe the process, noting that calibration adds both another layer of subjectivity but also 
enhances objectivity in ‘the way it is done’. A ProServ supervisor and an EquipMan 
subordinate both refer to increasing ‘fairness’ through a group perspective on individual 
subordinates’ performance. Participants perceive calibration as ‘weeding out the bias’ 
(EquipMan subordinate) and reducing the subjectivity of the rating process. 
To me the calibration is kind of the secret sauce. If you can calibrate well, and you 
have the right environment and the time to calibrate well, then it’s great. But if you 
don’t, then all the other failure modes could slip in. (EquipMan supervisor) 
 
The whole concept of the [calibration] is to try to take judgement…or bias out of the 
system as much as we can. (ProServ supervisor) 
 
 Calibration is intended to control leniency bias. This is achieved primarily by 
providing a forum in which ratings can be challenged for “evidence”, not necessarily by 
managers with direct knowledge of the subordinate under discussion.  
If you’re one of those folks that, you know, everybody you got is fantastic, you’ve got 
to sit in that room and tell your peers why Joe and Jane are so much better than John 
and Sue. And you force the dialog back to things that are specific to what that 
employee has done. (EquipMan subordinate) 
 
While the role of calibration panels in standardizing benchmarks and mitigating 
leniency bias is documented in the literature (Demeré et al. 2019), our field data provide 





many cases, calibration implicitly confirms initial ratings. While both supervisors and 
subordinates were keen to discuss the circumstances in which calibration would alter ratings, 
it is clear that this is not the norm, and for the majority of cases before the calibration panel 
the process also performs a critical confirmatory function. We document the incidence of 
changed ratings at approximately 10% in ProServ23 and it is clear in all three firms that the 
majority of ratings are robust to challenge24. The ratings of employees who meet expectations 
(the majority) are rarely challenged, ‘sometimes’ ratings at the top of the distribution are 
reduced, and ‘rarely’ are lower ratings increased. 
Feedback across a range of stakeholders …either confirms or balances the view of the 
manager in terms of the final rating. (FoodMan supervisor) 
 
Overall, there is evidence of substantial investment of resources in risk mitigation practices to 
reduce errors and bias, but in many cases will not impact ratings in any observable way. 
While other studies also note that calibration frequently does not change ratings, our data 
provide insight into the importance to participants of uncertainty reduction when ratings do 
not change.  
At the end of the day, we have been through a process, and all the assessment is done, 
it’s a drill down on the individual and it’s an assessment that says that person has 
been evaluated fairly based on their performance or potential. (EquipMan 
subordinate) 
 
I might say okay, in my head I’m forming a provisional rating. I carry that into the 
room, in the moderation meeting, and then I see corroboration for that, with other 
people, who have, you know, worked maybe more closely with these people, 
etc, (ProServ supervisor) 
 
Consensus-informed confirmation of initial ratings may also have positive benefits for 
subordinates. 
When you vet it with other people and they all agree, it’s a way to really incentivize 
and motivate people. (EquipMan subordinate) 
 
 
23 While we do not have specific estimates for FoodMan and EquipMan, the perception of participants was 
consistent with altered ratings in a minimal proportion of cases. 
24 Our findings are consistent with Bol et al. (2018), who document adjustments in 10.9% of cases. Demeré et 





Reducing uncertainty around performance evaluation reduces the risk of incentive 
misalignment and employee sorting errors, which are the overriding concerns of the 
participants in our study. 
Contrary evidence. While calibration is widely discussed as the primary strategy to 
mitigate the risks of errors and bias in subjective assessments, participants also identify 
several biases introduced by calibration. First, the focus of calibration is invariably on 
avoiding over-rating and challenging top performers. However, given the focus on top 
performers, calibration mitigates leniency only at the top rating level. Leniency biases in 
initial ratings that are present in the “meets expectations” category are less likely to attract 
attention at calibration. Consistent with Demeré et al. (2019), we observe (and managers 
confirm) that the disproportionate focus on challenging top performers is likely to increase 
centrality bias.  
If you rate an individual average, usually people wouldn’t really challenge… so 
maybe what the discretion is doing is actually averaging. (FoodMan subordinate) 
 
Sometimes we move people down (from the top group). We then move to the bottom 
group, same kind of discussion; occasionally we move somebody up, it’s usually less 
likely. (EquipMan supervisor) 
 
Second, several managers identify sources of error and bias that are inherent in the 
calibration process. While declaring that the process is ‘not about advocacy’ (ProServ 
supervisor), subordinates note the impact of variation in the ability or propensity of 
supervisors to skillfully and freely debate in calibration sessions. Supervisors that ‘fight 
harder’ (ProServ subordinate; EquipMan subordinate) or ‘sell their people very, very well’ 
(FoodMan subordinate) are influential. Alternatively, a FoodMan subordinate suggests that 
managers with biases against employees may choose ‘not to be very vocal about their cases’ 
in calibration meetings.  Subordinates also note the potential for information to be ‘over-
indexed’ (FoodMan subordinate), where challenges at calibration are driven by isolated 





subordinate being rated, particularly in a global setting where peer supervisors and 
subordinates are geographically dispersed (EquipMan supervisor; FoodMan subordinate). At 
ProServ, participants comment on the lack of transparency – a theme which is not evident at 
EquipMan or FoodMan. 
Your rating, you’re not in that meeting so you don’t see that…In practice it probably 
is fair, but the perception is where it brings it down. (ProServ subordinate). 
 
Our observations are consistent with Demeré et al.’s (2019) survey data, indicating that 
subordinates largely trust calibration outcomes (outcome justice) despite some concerns 
about transparency of process (procedural justice).  
 Finally, in addition to the biases articulated by our participants, analysis of our data 
reveals a further bias not acknowledged by managers. The strong belief in the effectiveness 
of calibration in weeding out bias and errors, and the perception of reduced subjectivity 
though calibration cited earlier, suggest that participants view consensus as a surrogate for 
accuracy.  
Managers can use as much discretion as they like, but they have to recognize the 
reality – the [calibration] will at the end of the day catch them out if they want to be 
irrationally subjective. (ProServ supervisor) 
 
While the correlation between consensus and accuracy may be high, there may also be a false 
sense that the results of the calibration sessions are reliable and objective, when in essence 
calibration reflects a further layer of subjectivity that reduces some errors and biases and 
generates others.  
V. DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY 
The analysis of PMRS practices in our field sites suggests that objective performance 
measurement has inherent weaknesses that the firms try to address with an extensive 
subjective overlay on objective performance measures. We draw our findings from a broad 
cross-section of roles and levels of management across four firms in a variety of industry 





not unusual in their task or management profile. The performance ratings and rewards we 
observe draw on objective performance signals and a broad range of subjective cues.  
Incentive alignment and employee sorting emerge as the most salient rationales for 
subjectivity in the PMRS in our field study firms. The firms invest in extensive information 
gathering to test the extent to which subordinate objective performance measures capture 
contributions to the firm, and they indicate preparedness to reduce performance ratings (and 
rarely increase them) if values are not adhered to, or behavior is self-serving or disruptive to 
the business. These observations are consistent with addressing incentive misalignment 
through information gathering, and flexible subjective assessments rather than through the 
design of better performance measures, or through discretionary weights on objective 
performance measures. We find that the firms manage employee sorting in a similar way. 
They subjectively rank employees with a view to managing talent, identifying individuals for 
retention, promotion and development.  
In contrast, we observe that the use of subjectivity to mitigate compensation risk is a 
less salient theme in our data. Nonetheless, this use of subjectivity is a moderately salient 
theme in both FoodMan and EquipMan as part of the initial rating process (see Appendix B). 
Compensation risk is similarly evident as a rationale in InvestServ in the determination of 
bonuses – which is in line with that company’s “bundled discretion”. It is not a salient theme 
at all in ProServ. When asked open questions about the role of subjectivity, respondent 
rationales focus on issues of incentive misalignment and employee sorting rather than 
compensation risk. The fact that we observe variation in the salience of this theme across our 
field study firms suggests that future research may investigate contingent factors which 






These findings complement the existing literature in several ways. We provide the 
first (to our knowledge) empirical evidence of the importance of the risk of incentive 
misalignment and employee sorting errors relative to employee compensation risk as the 
rationale for subjectivity in PMRS within firms. Firms struggle to align incentives through 
the ex-ante design of performance measures (Baker 2000). Further, many instances of 
misalignment result from unanticipated behavioral responses to objective performance 
measures25. Empirical evidence of this use of subjectivity is sparse in the accounting 
literature. Our field narratives complement Deller and Sandino (2020) in capturing the use of 
subjective assessments to manage the unanticipated behavioral misalignments that plague 
performance measurement practice. In addition, while the accounting literature examines the 
role of subjective adjustments in PMRS for employee retention (Woods 2012) and promotion 
(Grabner and Moers 2013; Bol and Leiby 2018), we find that employee sorting through 
relative performance evaluation is also an important rationale underpinning the use of 
subjectivity more generally in routine PMRS. Our findings suggest that by focusing on 
compensation risk, discretionary weighting of performance measures, or identifiable 
subjective measures, the accounting literature may underestimate the level of hidden 
subjectivity in performance rating practices, and the utility of this subjectivity in mitigating 
the firm risk of incentive misalignment and employee sorting errors.  
An important aspect of the form of subjective rating practices we observe is that 
subordinates in our settings could not be influenced by the expectation of rewards associated 
with achievement of specific objective performance goals. Given the subjective overlay on 
objective performance measures, subordinates wanting to choose actions to maximize their 
 
25 Several documented scandals can be traced to behavioral responses to well-intentioned performance 
measures. Examples include opening fake accounts to meet sales targets at Wells Fargo in the United States 
(Fritter 2020) and Commonwealth Bank of Australia (Ferguson 2018), and Australian police falsifying random 
driver alcohol tests by testing themselves in order to meet daily test volume targets (Mills 2018). While firms 






bonus or promotion prospects would need to anticipate the way two successive subjective 
rating processes would either alter or confirm their performance rating. This substantially 
dilutes the decision influence of objective performance measures (Luft et al. 2016). These 
observations are unlikely to be unusual, with meta analyses in the personnel psychology 
literature suggesting that the correlation between performance ratings and objective measures 
is approximately 27 to 39 percent (Heneman 1986; Bommer, Johnson, Rich, Podsakoff, and 
Mackenzie 1995). To the extent that this level of subjectivity is commonly interposed 
between performance measures and rating-driven bonuses, the decision influence of 
accounting performance measures can be better understood by considering these 
discretionary adjustments. 
Our findings also shed light on the information environment that underpins informed 
subjectivity. We find in all four firms that the application of subjectivity in the determination 
of ratings and rewards is informed by both formal and informal information gathering 
practices. This is particularly prevalent in gaining insight into the behaviors subordinates 
adopt to achieve their performance outcomes. Supervisors observe subordinates as part of 
everyday practice, but they also supplement these observations with information from the 
subordinate’s team members, peers and stakeholders on interdependent tasks. This 
information gathering is an important facilitator of informed subjective assessments. 
Hӧppe and Moers (2011) introduce information gathering in the form of board 
monitoring as a variable in incentive contracting. Other experimental studies identify specific 
forms of information gathering that facilitate subjective assessments (Fisher et al. 2005; 
Gillenkirch and Kreienbaum 2017; Maas et al. 2012). However, we offer the first field-based 
evidence of the relationship between observability, information gathering and subjectivity in 
PMRS in typical large firms. We note the importance of interdependent roles within firms in 





initial ratings and calibration. This finding complements Demeré et al. (2019), who highlight 
the important advocacy role of the immediate supervisor on calibration panels. Our findings 
also complement the literature that addresses supervisor incentives to invest in information 
gathering to support subjective assessments (Bailey et al. 2011; Maas et al. 2012; Bol 2011). 
While we do not have insights into the incentives to gather information in our field sites, we 
do observe widespread information gathering. We also document potential flaws in the 
quality of this information at the initial rating stage, where feedback may be selective or 
sanitized. Information quality appears more robust at calibration when it is subject to review 
by peers and higher-level mangers. Our observations complement Grabner et al. (2020), who 
capture a higher-level disciplining effect of calibration on supervisors that over-rate their 
subordinates, and Arshad et al. (2020), who note that calibration provides an incentive for 
supervisors to gather information to support initial ratings. 
An important contribution of our findings is the use of subjectivity to reduce 
uncertainty about the veracity of performance measurement when there is a risk of incentive 
misalignment or employee sorting errors. Within the supervisor/subordinate dyad, initial 
ratings on objective measures are reviewed subjectively (drawing in information about 
subordinate behavior), but this review frequently confirms ratings based on objective 
measures. Further information is gathered at calibration and again, this information most 
frequently confirms initial ratings. This suggests a role for subjectivity in reducing firm-level 
uncertainty about objective ratings, which is quite different to the commonly understood role 
of subjectivity in mitigating the risk to employees of uncertainty about the impact of 
uncontrollable events (compensation risk). The use of subjectivity to validate objective 
performance measurement is not evident in archival data that relies on rating changes to infer 





prior documentation of uncertainty reduction as an economic role for subjectivity, yet it is 
important in a risk mitigation model.  
While subjectivity is extensive across all four firms, it is introduced in different ways. 
In the broad narratives underpinning the PMRS description in EquipMan, FoodMan and 
ProServ performance measurement protocols rely on regular communication, feedback and 
“no surprises”. Resultant bonuses are relatively predictable as the year progresses. On the 
other hand, the discretionary allocation of bonuses at InvestServ allows the potential for less 
transparency, which one team within the firm noted. Importantly, InvestServ also has far less 
resource-intensive practices to mitigate errors and bias in subjective assessments. Our 
findings point to potential trade-offs in determining the investment in resource intensive 
strategies to mitigate errors and bias, and the level of transparency in subjective assessments. 
Raising similar issues, Ittner et al.’s (2003) study documents a subjective PMRS 
characterized by lack of transparency, perceptions of favoritism and ultimately, a fall-back to 
a focus on financial performance.  Contrasting Ittner et al.’s (2003) findings and the findings 
across our four participant firms, we suggest that the trade-offs firms make to optimize the 
upside benefits of subjectivity and the investment required to mitigate errors and bias, is a 
fruitful avenue for further research. 
VI. LIMITATIONS 
Our findings are naturally limited in scope and generalizability as they are a function 
of the PMRS in the small set of firms we study. Our sample comprises four stable PMRS in 
well-established and successful firms. Somewhat different patterns of behavior and uses of 
subjectivity may be observed in other settings. We have selected firms across a range of 
industries but the PMRS we observe are by no means exhaustive or necessarily typical. Even 
within that subset of firms we acknowledge that we do not have a complete picture of the 





limited set of informants we were able to interview and any archival documentation we 
received. Furthermore, we were only able to speak with supervisors and subordinates 
identified by the firm. This bias in respondent selection increases the risk of exposure to a 
sanitized account of reality. However, the responses to our questions are varied, credible and 
supported by examples. We have cited, across all firms, negative aspects of both processes 
and outcomes.  
Our method of data analysis also carries limitations. In order to align field narratives 
with theoretical constructs, a level of interpretation is necessary. While we rigorously 
validated each other’s coding many times, we acknowledge that the links between narratives 
and theory are not definitive. On the other hand, the patterns we observe are relatively robust 
to differences in interpretation at the margin. We also rely on the relative salience of narrative 
themes to guide our analysis of the dominant economic rationales for subjectivity.  We 
acknowledge that this is a suitable instrument for distilling themes in narrative data, but a 
blunt instrument to assess relative importance. We are unable to measure the relative 
economic value of subjectivity, the ultimate impact on the firm, or on compensation 
outcomes. 
While we acknowledge these limitations, we believe this study makes a further 
contribution by bringing new methods to the question of understanding subjectivity in 
performance measurement. This cross-sectional field study provides a unique insight into the 
rationale for subjectivity, the forms it takes, its consequences and the perceptions that 






APPENDIX A  
Interview Guide 
 
Italicized questions represent further prompts to be used if necessary.  
Section 1: Demographics: 
• Role title and description 
• Time in role 
• Time with company 
• Supervisor (e.g., profit center manager or higher): Number of direct reports (= number of people 
whose performance you evaluate?) 
• Subordinate: Level of management you report to 
o Who evaluates your performance? 
o How many managers are at a similar level and subject to similar evaluation? 
 
Section 2: Perceptions of corporate performance measurement practice: 
Supervisors and subordinates: What is the corporate approach to performance measurement at your 
level of management? Note - subordinates were asked to focus on their perceptions as a subordinate, 
not as a supervisor for their own subordinates. 
• Frequency of performance measurement and evaluation 
• Process 
o How is an overall evaluation determined? 
 Is there a formula that converts several measures to a performance “grade”? 
 What measures are used? Are these standardized across managers at the same level? 
 How does discretion enter the process? E.g., the measures themselves are qualitative? The 
weightings among measures can vary? Some objective measures are supplemented with 
some qualitative measures? The measures are objective, but the overall rating is subject to 
discretion? 
o Are bonuses/rewards dependent directly on performance measurement? 
 How? 
 Does discretion enter into the process of converting performance ratings into rewards? 
o What do you think is the rationale behind the process adopted at X company? 
 E.g., the balance between objectivity/discretion? 
 The relationship between performance measures, performance evaluation, and rewards 
(both direct bonuses and other rewards such as promotions)? 
• To what extent does the corporate practice of performance measurement bind you as a manager 
when you are evaluating subordinates? 
o Are there ways in which you can introduce additional discretion into the process? 
 Do you try to introduce more or less discretion into the process? Why? 
 How do you do this? 
 Do you think other managers at your level introduce more or less discretion into the 
process? 
• What are the most critical information sources you access when formulating judgments and 
evaluating performance? E.g., peer assessment, internal reports, your observations, the 
observations of others? 
• Do you think the process “works” to distribute rewards fairly relative to performance? 
o Why/why not? 
o Is discretion a critical part of the performance measurement process? Why/Why not? 
o Would you prefer that performance measurement was more objective or subjective? Why? 
• How do you think discretion impacts the outcomes of performance measurement? 
• Do you think other managers at your level hold similar or different views of the process? Explain 
differing views 
o Do you think the process affects some of your peers in ways that it does not impact on you? 






C-Ratios by Firm 
 










Research Question 1: Rationale  
 Incentive Misalignment 0.22 0.30 0.12 0.01 
 Employee Sorting 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.21 
 Compensation Risk 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.00 
Research Question 2: Mitigating Errors and Bias 
 Individual Subordinates 0.00 0.15 0.09 0.02 
 Across Subordinates 0.05 0.05 0.39 0.00 
FoodMan  
Research Question 1: Rationale 
 Incentive Misalignment 0.11 0.38 0.14 0.05 
 Employee Sorting 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.10 
 Compensation Risk  0.00 0.13 0.01 0.07 
Research Question 2: Mitigating Errors and Bias 
 Individual Subordinates 0.00 0.10 0.26 0.00 
 Across Subordinates 0.03 0.03 0.39 0.01 
InvestServ 
Research Question 1: Rationale 
 Incentive Misalignment 0.04 0.33 0.00 0.28 
 Employee Sorting 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.28 
 Compensation Risk 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.11 
Research Question 2: Mitigating Errors and Bias 
 Individual Subordinates 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 
 Across Subordinates 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ProServ 
Research Question 1: Rationale 
 Incentive Misalignment 0.10 0.44 0.08 0.01 
 Employee Sorting 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.11 
 Compensation Risk 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Research Question 2: Mitigating Errors and Bias 
 Individual Subordinates 0.00 0.24 0.04 0.00 
 Across Subordinates 0.02 0.05 0.31 0.00 
 
Notes: C-Ratio = n1,2 / (n1 + n2 - n1,2), where n1,2 = co-occurrence frequency of two codes c1 
and c2, with n1 and n2 being their occurrence frequency. PMRS is performance measurement 
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Participant Information EquipMan FoodMan InvestServ ProServ 
Supervisors 2 4 2 4 
Subordinates 10 8 4 4 
Total number of interviewees 12 12 6 8 
Average length of interview (mins) 38 47 57 53 
Minimum interview length (mins) 23 34 48 40 
Maximum interview length (mins) 49 61 71 60 
Average tenure at firm (years) 22 7 11 15 








Coding Scheme  
Code Definition Examples from Interview Data 
Subjective Measures 
Measures used in performance 
measurement and reward system 
(PMRS) are non-verifiable in nature. 
Measures might be things like build relationships with potential 
clients X, Y and Z. 
Subjective Initial Rating 
Judgement by supervisor who 
compiles performance measures and 
other information to formulate an 
initial numeric rating of subordinate 
performance 
I have an employee who I’ve assessed as a 2, he’s meeting 
expectations, he exceeds a few, but mostly he’s meeting…. He 
struggles to come up to speed as fast as I think he should. 
Subjective Final Rating 
Judgment by calibration panel 
consisting of peer and senior 
managers to determine final 
assessment of performance.  
She would submit something, but then it’s, you know, it’s juried, if 
you will, or it’s reviewed by other people who are familiar with my 
performance and they come to a consensus on my assessment, so, 
while it is probably more subjective, there is some objectivity to the 
way it’s done.  
Subjective Rewards 
Judgment involved in determining 
bonus and other rewards, altering the 
direct relationship between ratings 
and rewards. 
I felt the [rating to bonus] formula was quite punitive ….so I had 
that adjusted manually, like an intervention.   
 
Incentive Misalignment 
Subjectivity applied to ensure that 
individuals are rewarded for adding 
firm value and not rewarded for 
behaviors or decisions that produce 
sub-optimal firm outcomes 
A lot of people get marked down because for one reason or another 




Subjectivity applied to rank order 
individuals to differentiate them for 
the purpose of bonus, retention, 
promotion, or development 
I think people really have a tough time understanding they’ll work 
their tail off, they’ll do everything and more than what is asked of 
them, right? But, yet they won’t be rated amongst the top performers 
and we can’t tell them how or what they can do to be rated a top 
performer. I think about the NFL or something, right. You might be 
getting paid okay, performing well for your team, but does that 
necessarily mean you’re going to play in the pro bowl? Will you be 
the best of the best and then, and it’s kind of the same here.  
Compensation Risk 
Subjectivity applied to take into 
account uncontrollable factors 
impacting on individual performance 
If somebody missed their numbers, maybe not a big miss, but they 
were lower than what the commitment or the plan was, but, say it 
was because the markets went down, but they continued to work 
with customers, continued to grow share, I’m not going to penalize 
them if the markets go down, right? 
Mitigating Errors and Bias 
Strategies implemented to mitigate 
risks of errors and bias arising from 
subjectivity, including 
• Information gathering about 
individual subordinates’ 
performance, and 
• Review of initial performance 





I ask people outside the team that they worked with what had 
worked, what wasn’t working, what did the person focus on? 
 
 
The reason we run calibration processes is because people may not 







Code Frequencies by Firm 
 
Code EquipMan FoodMan InvestServ ProServ Total 
Subjective PMRS Practices 
Subjective Measures 32 28 8 19 87 
Subjective Initial Rating 96 131 30 105 362 
Subjective Final Rating 103 77 0 97 277 
Subjective Rewards 29 84 72 44 229 
Total Frequencies 260 320 110 265 955 
Rationale 
Incentive Misalignment 52 101 39 72 264 
Employee Sorting 40 26 23 37 126 
Compensation Risk 12 17 8 3 40 
Total Frequencies 104 144 70 112 430 
Mitigating Errors and Bias 
Individual Subordinate 27 36 5 29 97 
Across Subordinates 51 37 0 34 122 
Total Frequencies 78 73 5 63 219 
 
See Table 2 for code definitions.  








Code Co-Occurrences - All Firms 
 









Research Question 1: Rationale 
 Incentive Misalignment 38 169 50 34 
 Employee Sorting 1 23 53 51 
 Compensation Risk 1 34 2 15 
Research Question 2: Mitigating Errors and Bias 
 Individual Subordinate 0 62 39 1 
 Across Subordinates 7 19 106 1 
 
See Table 2 for code definitions.  
Code co-occurrence measures the frequencies with which coded narratives referring to each 
subjective practice co-occur with coded narratives relating to each rationale, and the 
incidence of strategies to mitigate errors and bias. Co-occurrences proxy for interactions of 
concepts underlying the codes.  









C-Ratios - All Firms 
 










Research Question 1: Rationale 
 (A) Incentive Misalignment (A1)    0.12 (A2)      0.37 (A3)       0.10 (A4)     0.07 
 (B) Employee Sorting  (B1)    0.00 (B2)  0.05 (B3)       0.15 (B4)     0.17 
 (C) Compensation Risk (C1)     0.01 (C2)      0.09 (C3)       0.01 (C4)     0.06 
Research Question 2: Mitigating Errors and Bias  
 (D) Individual Subordinate (D1)    0.00 (D2)    0.16 (D3)      0.12 (D4)    0.00 
 (E) Across Subordinates (E1)    0.03 (E2)    0.04 (E3)      0.36 (E4)     0.00 
 
C-Ratio = n1,2 / (n1 + n2 - n1,2), where n1,2 = co-occurrence frequency of two codes c1 and c2 
(from Table 4), with n1 and n2 being their occurrence frequency (from Table 3). For 
example, the C-ratio between the Incentive Misalignment code and the Subjective Measures 
code is calculated as 38 / (264 + 87 – 38) = 0.12, where n1 and n2 are found in Table 3 and 
n1,2 is found in Table 4. 
See Table 4 notes for description of co-occurrence frequency.  
PMRS refers to performance measurement and reward systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
